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Note: Because this document is prepared Pro se defendant was 
unable to obtain the numbered record from this Court, and having 
been denied access to file held by previous Attorney, H. Don 
Sharp, Esq., references contained herein will be according to the 
original transcript numberings. Defendant begs the Courtfs 
indulgence. 
COMES NOW Jack Hyrum Hallett to petition the Court for a 
rehearing of his case. In that there were many issues not 
submitted to this court for consideration as to ineffective 
assistance of Counsel and inadmissable testimony from witnesses 
which prejudiced the outcome of the trial, Defendant respectfully 
requests a rehearing of these matters. 
Defendant further requests reconsideration of this Court on 
the prejudicial effect of the unqualified expert witnesses 
statements as well as hearsay testimony from the mother of the 
alleged victim and the impairment of proper cross examination of 
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the alleged victim perpetuated by the "mental age" designation 
given her by witnesses that were not qualified to make such an 
assessment. Defendant asserts that the record will show that the 
alleged victims "mental age" confounded the trier of fact and 
was in violation of Utah Rule of Evidence 702. Moreover, the 
opinion regarding the "mental age" of the alleged victim was 
based in part upon information the witness obtained from a test 
that had not been administered to the woman being assessed. 
Defendant asserts that the entire trial was prejudiced by 
the hearsay testimony of witnesses that were accepted as "expert" 
when, in fact, they were not qualified as such under Utah Law, 
Title 58-25-(l-12) U.C.A. The evidence admitted by these 
witnesses contaminated the evidence in all of the cases before 
the Court. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
The defendant's appeal has as much to do with ineffective 
assistance of counsel as with the error already recognized by 
this court in its opinion filed July 13, 1990. The ineffective 
assistance of counsel was not adequately addressed in the 
defendant's brief. 
a. The waiver of a jury was done as a last minute thing. 
Defendant was told by counsel that "this matter can be 
handled in the judge's chambers. I don't think we need to 
have a jury." A jury was ready to hear the case and the 
waiver could only have been done for reasons of convenience 
to the appointed defense counsel. While counsel states he 
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left the decision up to the defendant,( T-3 L-21-22) he had 
misled the defendant to persuade him to dismiss the jury 
without advising him of the consequences of that action. 
Further, the defendant was unaware that any but the original 
charge (1149) was to be heard that day. He was unaware 
that he would be tried for a second degree felony until 
after the waiving of the jury. Therefore defendant's waiver 
of the jury was not an informed waiver, despite the Court's 
limited explanation that defendant had the right to be 
judged by eight persons who must agree on a verdict. (T-3 L-
25, T-4 L-ll) Counsel did not explain why he waived the 
jury. He said only that he "left the decision largely to 
Mr.Hallett." (T-3 L-22) and denied the trial court correct 
information thus denying his client a fair and unbiased 
trial. The record shows no submission of requested jury 
instructions, and shows no prior submission of a written 
waiver of trial by jury. The trial judge's schedule for 
trials in Duchesne is not known, but the court's explanation 
that sentencing could not be done with the aid of a 
presentence report until the expiration of more than 3 0 days 
would indicate that reasons of time rather than the best 
interests of the defendant dictated a waiver of jury trial, 
some of these reasons are discussed in B, infra. 
B* Failure to demand a severance of the cases. It would be 
inaccurate to presume that a trial judge is not susceptible 
to the influence of the effect of cumulative charges, and to 
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the prosecutorial evidence presented to support them. This 
will be further discussed hereafter. Judges are trained in 
the law, but they are no more discerning judges of the facts 
than are citizens who respond to the call to jury duty. 
Competently, this case would have been tried as three cases; 
(1) the first charge of sexual abuse, (2) the second and 
third charges of sexual abuse, and (3) the charges of 
witness tampering. The convenience of the trial court at 
not prolonging these cases for additional trials and the 
appointed defense counsel's acquiescence to the time needs 
of the court in this (T-3 L-18), and other crucial matters 
(T-10 L-2-4) (T-84 L-17-19) prompted a combining of all of 
the cases, and gave unwarranted credibility to the State's 
witnesses, much to the detriment of the defendant. 
C. The failure of appointed counsel to invoke Rule of Evidence 
615, excluding all witnesses from the courtroom was 
incompetent. To allow witnesses to hear each other testify 
cannot but be a mistake seriously prejudicial to Defendant 
in a case where so much truth vouching was permitted by 
appointed defense counsel and by the trial court. (T-20 L-6-
14,(T-34 L-7-10, T-36 L-14,) No explanation is contained in 
the record why this was done. This case (1149) contaminated 
the entire trial and a law trained district court judge is 
susceptible to the influence of contamination even though 
not to the degree, perhaps, that a jury would be, still 
sufficient to be confused as to the evidence and that 
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confusion is prejudicial to the defendant. Had none of the 
evidence of case 1149 been heard, had no hearsay evidence 
been accepted, it is likely the outcome of the trial would 
have been favorable to defendant on all the charges tried to 
the Court. 
D. The failure of defense counsel to prepare the case for trial 
is obvious from the record. He had no knowledge of certain 
of the witnesses that were called by the prosecution (T-23 
L-9). This was confirmed by the prosecutor's statement 
"There was no names given" (T-24 L-3). Thus cross 
examination was unprepared. He submitted no request for 
discovery and was totally unprepared to deal with the issues 
involving expert witness qualifications, hearsay from expert 
witnesses and truth vouching. He did virtually nothing to 
deal with the presentation of a defense. What the appointed 
defense counsel failed to do is not entirely in the record. 
His blatant errors are as much errors of omission as errors 
of commission, therefore it becomes necessary to go beyond 
the record to reveal some of Counsel's many errors. 
Counsel spent less than three hours with defendant in 
preparation for trial. At no time did appointed Counsel 
meet with defendant without Francis Cordle present excepting 
only in open court at arraignment on the six additional 
charges brought after Francis Cordle was incarcerated for 
failure to honor the subpoena. This lack of consultation, 
in and of itself gives rise to reversible error, dropping 
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below an objective standard of reasonableness and but for 
Counsel's deficit performance there is reasonable likelihood 
of a result more favorable to defendant. Strickland v. 
Washington 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
Witnesses were available, but were not called, to 
testify on behalf of defendant, witnesses with knowledge of 
pertinent matters supporting defendant's innocence and 
revealing motivation of State's witnesses to lie about the 
matter to be decided. (See Addendum I) 
Any competent medical person could have documented the 
defendant's physical inability to hold a butcher knife due 
to deformity and atrophy of the muscles and tendons of his 
wrist and hand from an injury incurred several decades 
before. (See Addendum II) This testimony would have readily 
impeached the credibility of the State's witness who said he 
had used a butcher knife to threaten her. A closing 
statement by appointed counsel could have pointed out the 
unlikely possibility that defendant would have sought out 
the same butcher knife on two distinctly separate occasions 
in which the State's witness claims to have been 
spontaneously threatened by defendant. Counsel's performance 
violated defendant's Constitutional rights to counsel. 
The sixth amendment right to "have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defense" (McMann v Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 
771 n. 14 (1970) 
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is right to 
effective assistance of counsel. "Defendant is entitled to 
more than just a warm body standing next to him during 
criminal process" U.S. v. Otero. 848 F.2d 835, 837, 839 (7th 
Cir. 1988) 
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To have incomplete and/or inaccurate information seriously 
impedes the Court's ability to make a correct evaluation and 
therefore prejudices the defendant. Appointed Counsel was little 
more than "a warm body ... " at trial. A closing statement or 
proper cross examination of Francis Cordle would have shown 
Francis Cordle registered on October 17, 1984 at the Echo Park 
Motel in Vernal (T-60 L-2-15) as testified, but would impeach her 
testimony of fear for her life by virtue of her having not stayed 
even one night at the motel, although she testified that 
defendant had ordered her to stay gone "two or three days11 (T-60-
L-9-11). Arrest records should have been entered and police 
reports entered that would have revealed that Francis Cordle 
returned to the home she shared with Jack Hallett that same day, 
where, on the afternoon of October 17, 1984 she was arrested and 
jailed for non-compliance with a subpoena. (Effort is being made 
to obtain that record for this Court, and it will be submitted as 
an addendum later if not obtained at this filing) Failure to 
bring this to the attention of the trial Court shows lack of 
preparation on the part of appointed Counsel resulting in serious 
prejudice to his client. Had such knowledge been made known to 
the Court there is a strong likelihood of a more favorable 
judgement having been rendered. Defense Counsel waived a closing 
argument, thus jeopardizing his Client and handicapping the trial 
Court. 
HEARSAY EVIDENCE WAS RELIED UPON IN ALL THE CASES 
The Trial Court cites in its ruling on each of the cases its 
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reasons for findings of guilt. This Court has reversed 1149 
because the Trial Court relied on witnesses who tendered hearsay 
evidence inappropriately admitted under 76-5-411, In 1149 the 
trial court cited testimony from many witnesses whose testimony 
this Court ruled was inadmissible hearsay and reversed. Yet in 
each of the other cases the trial Court relied upon the testimony 
of Francis Cordle (T-88 L-10, 22, T-89 L-15) who also tendered 
hearsay testimony.(T-51-L-2, T-52-L-2 through 1-25) This hearsay 
testimony was admitted without any foundation for acceptance, 
over the objections of appointed Counsel, and defendant asserts 
that hearsay testimony from Francis Cordle is just as 
inappropriate as hearsay testimony from "expert" witnesses who do 
not qualify as experts under Utah code. 
THE COURT WAS CONFUSED BY THE EVIDENCE AND UNABLE TO CLEARLY OR 
CORRECTLY PERFORM ITS "OBLIGATION TO SORT THROUGH" (T-5 L-l-2) 
A. The court, after hearing all evidence before him found "the 
most difficult part of this case" (singular,) "is trying to 
keep the different numbers separate" (T-86 L-8-10). He did 
not hear the cases separately, nor did he adjudge guilt 
separately. It would seem since he heard the case in a 
singular sense he had determined without sorting out 
evidence that defendant must be guilty or not guilty on all 
counts. 
On Case 1149 the Court cites testimony of April (T-88 L-4) 
as part of the basis for a finding of guilty as charged. 
The testimony of April is devoid of any mention of any of 
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the charges made in 1149. This judgement is based upon 
clear error. 
On cases 84-CR-101 and 102, Tampering with a witness the 
Court states that he relies upon Francis1 testimony as it 
corroborated April's testimony.(T-88 L-21) However, at no 
time in her testimony did April indicate any threat, nor did 
she testify that she and her mother going to Vernal and 
avoiding appearance in court was in any way at the prompting 
of, or threat from, defendant. The record reflects no 
testimony from April in any manner connected with threats or 
tampering. She has neither made such an assertion, nor has 
she supported her mother's allegation of tampering. The 
Court states that he "chooses to believe the testimony of 
Francis, as corroborated by April" (T-89 L-l-2) when, in 
fact the record does not reflect that April corroborated her 
mother's story at all. This is a clear error of fact. 
On case 84-CR-103, the Court based his finding of guilty on 
testimony by April (T-89 L-6) that April was very clear and 
very precise in the testimony (T-89 L-7). In fact the 
record shows April was precise about an incident, but quite 
unsure about where it occurred, not even sure whether or not 
she was in bed. (T-46 L-3) 
In case of 84-CR-104 the State alleges defendant touched the 
breast of April, hugging her from behind. Again the Court 
chooses to believe the Defendant is guilty despite the 
conflict in the stories of the two accounts given by April 
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and Francis, one saying he was hugging April from behind (T-
44 L-2), the other saying he was trying to force April to 
hug him(T-55 L-15-17). It is not reasonable, nor 
believable, that one could expect someone to hug who is held 
from behind• Defense Counsel was remiss in not clarifying 
this discrepancy, had he done so the findings at trial would 
likely have been more favorable to defendant, the trial 
Court would likely have found Francis Cordle less than 
believable, affording weight to defendant's denial. 
In cases 84-CR-99 and 100 the Court relied entirely 
upon the testimony of Francis Cordle. He finds the 
defendant's statement to be corroborative, despite 
defendant's consistent denial of the charge. 
"I did not give her $100.00 to leave town. But I did 
give her $100.00 to pay the drug store bill, which is 
$50.00 and regardless of what happened here, if I was 
not released on the 17th, she would have had gas and 
cigarette money and et cetera to get by until the first 
of the month when she should be getting her check.11 (T-
83 L-7-12) 
The Court seems to have ignored Francis Cordlefs 
acquiescence to the fact that defendant had given her money 
on many other occasions (T-65 L-18-19), choosing to believe 
her statement over defendant's, finding him guilty on her 
statement alone and ignoring also, it seems, the state's 
burden to prove guilt. 
THE ENTIRE TRIAL WAS CONTAMINATED BY TESTIMONY OF "EXPERT11 
WITNESSES IN VIOLATION OF UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 7 02 
A. April was improperly designated to be a "child11. The Court 
accepted this opinion as fact and overruled objections to 
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leading witness testimony (T-43 L-9-13) and inappropriate 
means of taking testimony (T-41 L-22 through T-4 2 L-3) based 
on the mental age factor for which no underlying scientific 
reliability or validity exists. State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 
388, (Utah 1989) dealt not only with hearsay evidence, but 
of equal importance, the issue of reliability and validity 
of the basis for scientific testimony. The Utah Supreme 
Court held in Rimmasch that 
"...where expert testimony is based upon novel 
scientific principles or techniques, courts have long 
imposed additional tests of admissibility that antedate 
the federal rules. The most commonly used is that set 
forth in Frye v. United States. 293 F. 1013(D.C. 
Cir.1923, "in addition to satisfying the traditional 
requirements of relevancy and helpfulness to the trier 
of fact the proponent must show general acceptance of 
the principle or technique [upon which the testimony is 
based] in the scientific community." McCormick, 
McCormick on Evidence section 203, at 605(E. Cleary, 3d 
ed. 1984)[hereinafter McCormick]; see, e.g., Phillips 
v. Jackson. 615 P.2d 1228, 1233(Utah 1980). As we 
noted in Phillips, the purpose of a more restrictive 
test for judging the admissibility of scientific 
testimony is to assure, as a threshold matter, that the 
evidence is sufficiently reliable to go to the finder 
of fact. Id. (Bold emphasis added) 
One danger being guarded against is the tendency 
of the finder of fact to abandon its responsibility to 
decide the critical issues and simply adopt the 
judgment of the expert despite an inability to 
accurately appraise the validity of the underlying 
science. 
... "Inherent reliability," rather than "general 
acceptance," became the touchstone of admissibility 
under Phillips." 
The State did not meet either the Frve test of general 
acceptance, nor the Phillips requirement of reliability of 
the tests to determine accurately as a threshold matter that 
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the evidence is sufficiently reliable to go to the finder of 
fact. The only test administered to April Cordle was the 
Stanford-Binet test, although it was not revealed which of 
the many Stanford-Binet tests he actually administered, (I'-
ll L-3) and "wide-range achievement test" (T-ll L-4). There 
is no evidence that these tests accurately determine mental 
age and in fact the Stanford-Binet "yields lower IQ scores 
in the mentally retarded range" (See Addendum III) They 
are not accepted to measure mental age by the "scientific 
community" required by the Frye test, nor do they have 
"inherent reliability" for that purpose as required under 
Phillips. Yet testimony was admitted without foundation as 
to reliability or validity. 
It should be emphasized that the mental age projected by Mr. 
Szaraniec (T-ll L-17) and reaffirmed under leading questioning 
from the State (T-12 L-16-17) was "derived from her responses 
totally to the [Stanford-Binet] test..." (T-ll L-18) and couches 
his testimony as to April's mental impairment in "terms of 
academic ... ability" only (T-ll L-21). Mr. Szaraniec testified 
that he had administered a "wide-range achievement test", but no 
testimony was given pertaining to it. The Court was, no doubt 
confused and misled by the testimony Mr. Szaraniec gave 
concerning testimony of information from the test he did not 
administer to April, the Bender-Gestalt test. (T-13 L-3 through 
T-13) This unfounded testimony was later vouched for by Mr. 
Harrison (T-20 L-6-14). Such testimony, defendant asserts, could 
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not avoid being confusing to the trier of fact. It was 
confounding to Defense Counsel, even to impairing counsel's cross 
examination of April (T-46 L-4-7) withdrawing his question on 
the basis of testimony given by Mr. Szaraniec, and probably 
preventing pertinent questions involving consensual interaction 
with defendant. It is clear from the record that April had the 
capability to give consent as she testified having denied consent 
in that she testified she "said no" to alleged advances (T-44 L-
23). This meets the test in People v. Blunt 212 N.E. 719. The 
record indicates no trouble communicating with April (T-16 L-l-6) 
Proper cross examination would have included exploration into the 
defendant's actions following the alleged "no." Such cross 
examination would either have revealed total acquiescence to her 
will, or that the incident never actually happened at all. 
Certainly April's testimony that she said "no" is not the same 
story Francis tells of April "hollaring real loud and crying." 
It is of little wonder the Court was confused in his rulings. 
It should be noted that the only alleged instances about 
which April testified were instances when her mother was present. 
Had the viable issue of consent been raised instead of excluded 
by the unfounded mental age determined by Mr. Szaraniec, the 
outcome of the trial would have been more favorable to defendant. 
Had appointed Counsel pointed out the fact that April was 
nineteen years of age and did not require parental permission to 
marry, the credibility of that statement (T-51 L-14 and T-68 L-l-
5), and indeed the over all veracity of Francis Cordle would have 
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come under question. The witness would not have been 
"believable" (T-88 L-10) nor is it likely the Court would "choose 
to believe Francis" (T-89 L-l) over the denial by defendant. Had 
the issue of protecting her mother been raised it is probable 
that the Court would have found that April would have done 
anything she was told to do to prevent her mother from being put 
back in jail. It is ludicrous to believe a woman of nineteen is 
not able to lie. Certainly she could not have been truthful to 
her mother who said April had never lied to her (T-53 L-17-18). 
Aside from the obvious truth-vouching, it is not reasonable that 
a girl who had engaged in an incestuous sexual relationship with 
her brother over a continuing period of several years (T-3 0 L-4-
16) had never lied about her activities to her mother. 
Defendant submits that the influence of inadmissable 
evidence has so contaminated this trial as to constitute 
reversible error on all counts. Defendant further submits that 
Defense Counsel's failure to prepare and present a proper defense 
constitutes reversible error. 
The accumulation of the above cited errors, and others in 
the record which space in this document forbid exploring, has 
brought about a denial of a fair trial and an erroneous verdict 





COMES NOW James Bell, having been duly sworn, on his OATH 
disposes and says: 
I, James Bell, lived next door to Jack Hallett for two 
years. I had continual interaction with him and members of his 
household. I was in a position to know of his comings and 
goings. I was present at Jack Hallett1s trial October 17, 1984. 
I expected to be called as a witness, but was not. 
I have personal knowledge of Francis Cordle and her daughter 
April, and I have personal knowledge that Francis Cordle did not 
plan nor expect to testify at Jack's trial and had, in fact 
planned that Jack would marry her to prevent it. Francis had told 
t 
me many times that she would not testify against Jack. Francis 
told me that there was "no truth to the charge brought against 
Jack". Francis threatened that if she could get hold of the 
person who started this mess, that she would "fix them." She 
said Barbara, Jack's ex-wife, was a "Bitch" and said she thought 
Barbara was the cause of all this, that Barbara started it all, 
meaning the charge against Jack Hallett. 
I have personal knowledge that Francis expected Jack to 
marry her. She told me she was "counting on him marrying her so 
she would not have to testify against him" in court. Many times 
she said, "I will never testify" against Jack. 
I have personal knowledge that Francis Cordle had no qualms 
about lying. Francis told me on one occasion that "it was more 
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fun to lie than to tell the truth." She also bragged to me that 
she could "lie her way out of anything." 
I have personal knowledge of an argument between Francis and 
Jack when they were quarrelling after the sex abuse charges were 
brought against Jack. Francis wanted Jack to take her and April 
and jump bail and "go somewhere else until this mess blew over." 
Jack refused to do it. This was the time that I was outside 
their trailer and heard them quarrelling. They didn't know I was 
there. They didn't know I was hearing what they were saying. 
I have personal knowledge that Francis was angry and 
frustrated because Jack wouldn't marry her. She was extremely 
jealous. She was jealous of everyone, she was even jealous of 
Pearl. Pearl is my Aunt, she was an old woman, near 70 years 
old. 
I have personal knowledge that Jack treated April just like 
she was one of his own children. Francis was jealous of anything 
that was female. I never saw or heard Jack say or do anything 
that would remotely indicate that wanted to marry April or that 
he had any sexual interest in her whatsoever. She was just like 
one of his kids. His attitude toward her was that of a father, 
the same as I have toward my girls. 
I have personal knowledge that Jack pushed Francis into 
getting her SSI. Generally he was the one that was pushing her 
toward being independent. 
I have personal knowledge that Francis was not truthful. 
She would say whatever was handy. She has lied to me when it fit 
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her purpose. 
I have personal knowledge that there was motive for April 
and Francis to lie about Jack, the motive of vengeance. A verbal 
altercation Francis and April had with Jack just before Christmas 
caused an unpleasant scene. The argument took place over some 
rabbits that Jack had cooked. The incident evolved into such an 
argument that I, and the other guests that were invited there for 
dinner that evening, left and went home. April was very mad at 
Jack, then as soon as Christmas break was over and April went 
back to school these charges were brought against Jack. 
I have personal knowledge that Jack expected Francis and 
April would be in court October 17, 1984. I watched Francis 
leave the yard just ahead of us as we were going to Court. I 
asked Jack where she was going and Jack stated that Francis and 
April were going to court. That was around 9:00 in the morning. I 
have personal knowledge that Francis lied on the witness stand at 
Jack's trial. 
I SWEAR upon my oath that this is a true and accurate 
statement. 
S James Bell 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 26th day of July, 1990 
ADDENDUM I I 
tlALuUEa 1 1 , J aCK. 
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JACK HALLETT J . / 
#45115 ^ - A c y ^ v ^ r T s ^ ^ d 
3/15/90 
The patient, twenty years ago, had a severe fracture of the right wrist. He 
said it was never set properly. He's been working continually, but has had 
increasing weakness of the right wrist and hand, pain in the right wrist and 
hand. Particularly has weakness in flexion of the thumb, index and long 
finger. 
EXAMINATION: 
He has obvious old silver-fork deformity of the distal radius, and obvious old 
Colles' fracture that had a malunion. He has pain, tenderness and some 
crunching crepitation in the wrist. He has a slightly positive Tinel's sign 
j over the median nerve, but no numbness in the distribution of the median nerve 
5 even though there's some atrophy of the skin and atrophy of the thenar muscles 
b O of the right hand. He has barely perceptible flexion of the profundus 
.rfe tendon/distal joints of thumb, index finger. The grip of the right hand is 15-
0 5 20 lbs., the left hand is 80 lbs. He does, however, have full flexion and 
^ Q extension of the fingers, but he has to catch the index and long finger with 
3 as ^  the ring finger to flex them down into full flexion and into the palm which he 
• 3 j£ can do. By themselves, however, he cannot flex the index, thumb and long 
5 2?1** finger into the palm. 
^ CO This is an old industrial injury. 
X-RAY: 
X-rays of the wrist and hand show an old fracture of the fifth metacarpal shaft 
in good position with good healing. 
The wrist is very interesting. He has obvious malunion of the Colles' 
fracture, chips over the tip of the ulnar styloid, marked old radial carpal 
joint disruption. He has a large dorsal lacuna of the capitate/lunate bones 
which appear to be either fused or the lunate bone completely worn away. The 
proximal half of the navicular bone is completely worn away. 
DIAGNOSIS: 
1. Post-traumatic arthritis/spondylosis of right wrist. 
2. Destruction loss of the proximal half of the navicular bone/lunate bone 
right wrist. 
Loss of flexor function of profundus tendons to thumb, index and long 
finger right hand. 
Atrophy of thenar muscles right hand. bs 
ADDENDUM III 
Psychological Testing: Tests in Common Usage 57 
genuineness of their interest in rearing the child, their emotional 
maturity and parenting skills are more important than their intelli-
gence per se. 
There are, of course, exceptions. For example, there might be 
some valid reason to question whether a parent is so intellectually 
impaired that the child's welfare might be compromised. In some in-
stances, a child could have special needs that one parent is intellec-
tually more capable of understanding and satisfying, other factors 
being essentially equivalent between the parents. 
The tests that follow have been included because they are the best 
instruments available for assessing intelligence at different ages. 
There are several brief forms of intelligence tests and intellectual or 
developmental screening devices on the market, but this author can 
find no justification for their use in forensic practice. Likewise, the 
assessment or even estimation of intelligence through performance 
on tests such as the Draw-A-Person Test, the Peabody Picture Vo-
cabulary Test, the Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test and the Ror-
schach Ink Blot Test is not recommended. While these may be useful 
for other specialized purposes, this author cannot support their use 
for the assessment of intelligence in forensic psychology, given the 
availability of tests superior for that purpose. 
Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale 
As a measure of general intelligence, the Stanford-Binet Intelli-
gence Scale has withstood the test of time well. It has been revised 
several times throughout the decades of the twentieth century (Ter-
man, 1916; Terman & Merrill, 1937, 1960, 1973), the maintenance 
of its status reflected both by its longevity and in surveys which indi-
cate that it is one of the ten most frequently used psychological tests 
(Korchin & Schuldberg, 1981; Lubin, Wallis, & Paine, 1971). 
The Manual for the Third Revision (Terman & Merrill, 1960) in-
cludes some important content and structural changes from the 1937 
version (Terman & Merrill, 1937) but makes use of the same set of 
normative data collected in 1937. The most recent edition of the 
manual (Terman & Merrill, 1973) contains the 1960 version of the 
scale but provides tables for the conversion of raw scores into devia-
tion IQscores based upon new norms collected in 1971 and 1972. 
Whereas the standardization samples for the Wechsler scales 
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gence, such as cultural deprivation or membership in a minority 
group whose language differs from standard English. Since the 
Stanford-Binet is heavily weighted toward verbal intellectual func-
tioning, individuals who have been culturally deprived or who are 
members of ethnic minorities would tend to be penalized by obtain-
ing a single I Q score contaminated by an unknown amount of vari-
ance that is not evidence of their intellectual capabilities. 
An additional advantage of the Wechsler scales over the 
Stanford-Binet is the formers' assessment of specific areas of cogni-
tive functioning through the use of distinct subtests. The items on 
the Stanford-Binet are not grouped according to different types of 
cognitive skills. Factor analytic studies of the Stanford-Binet (Stott & 
Ball, 1965; Terman & Merrill, 1973) have identified specific item 
groupings that measure memory, problem-solving ability and verbal 
reasoning skills primarily, but users of the test often do not make ref-
erence to these findings. 
Instead, some psychologists make statements about the specific 
skills that a tested individual possesses by referring to his perform-
ance on items that seem to address the same ability because of their 
content. This practice is untenable since the statistical evaluation of 
items indicates that the obtained factors are made up of items that 
are not necessarily similar wnen taken at face value. Conversely, 
items that appear to address the same construct do not necessarily do 
so (Wright et al., 1979). 
When a psychologist reports a finding of relative intellectual 
strengths and weaknesses based upon an individual's performance 
on the Stanford-Binet as part of a forensic assessment, inquiry 
should be made into the basis for these statements. If factor analytic 
studies have not been used as a resource, the report of differences in 
cognitive abilities should be regarded as unsubstantiated and the 
conclusions that follow from them are unwarranted. 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale — Revised 
The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (usually referred to as the 
WAIS, prounded like "waist" without the final V ) has long b£en the 
most popular adult intelligence test and one of the ten most widely 
used of all psychological tests (Golden, 1979; Korchin & Schuld-
berg, 1981; Lubin et al., 1971). The reputation it enjoys is well de-
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(Wechsler, 1963, 1974, 1981) were stratified primarily on the basis 
of variables such as race, area of residence, and socioeconomic status 
to ensure representation proportionate to the general population, 
the main variable used to stratify the Stanford-Binet sample was 
ability. Ability was defined according to performance on another test 
by the same publisher, the Cognitive Abilities Test, for which exten-
sive sampling data had recently been obtained. Care was taken in se-
lecting the communities for sampling, so that there is representation 
of nonwhites and different socioeconomic groupings. 
The emphasis on obtaining a wide range of ability at each age 
may have resulted in better discriminatory power of the Stanford-
Binet over the Wechsler scales at both extremes of intellectual func-
tioning. In comparison to the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, for 
example, the Stanford-Binet yields lower I Q scores in the mentally 
retarded range and higher I Q scores in the superior range (Golden, 
1979). If mental retardation or superior intellectual functioning is an 
issue in an evaluation, the Stanford-Binet is the preferred assess-
ment instrument. 
Like the Wechsler scales, the Stanford-Binet has a mean of 100. 
Its standard deviation is 16, however, whereas the standard devia-
tion of the Wechsler scales is 15. With the exception of the superior 
ranges, the categories of classification of I Q scores into ranges of in-
tellectual functioning are identical to those used for the Wechsler 
Scales (see the section, "Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale"). For the 
Stanford-Binet, the I Q range between 120 and 139, inclusive, is la-
beled superior, and 140 to 169, inclusive, is called very superior (Terman 
& Merrill, 1973). 
By definition, the largest proportion of individuals function 
somewhere in the low average to high average range of intelligence. For 
this segment of the population, the Wechsler scales are preferable to 
the Stanford-Binet for intellectual assessment. The Stanford-
Binet yields a single I Q score, conceptually comparable to the Full 
Scale IQ obtained on the Wechsler scales. The Wechsler scales, in ad-
dition, reliably and validly differentiate between verbal and per-
formance aspects of cognitive functioning, yielding a Verbal 1rQ and a 
Performance IQ, 
The capability of differentiation between these areas of cognitive 
functioning is important, for example, in cases involving brain in-
jury and with respect to variables that selectively affect verbal intelli-
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